Choi, Ji-Woong Kang, Min-Sung Park, Chang Hoon Yang, Hyung-Jin Han, Sang-Wook 2024-01-19T15:03:20Z 2024-01-19T15:03:20Z 2021-09-05 2021-04 1570-0755 https://pubs.kist.re.kr/handle/201004/117219 Quantum entity authentication (QEA) based on security guaranteed by the laws of physics is the first and most important step for secure communication under the threat of a quantum adversary. QEA theoretically provides unconditional security; however, there is a threat of quantum hacking owing to imperfection of measurement devices in the actual implementation. The proposed measurement-device-independent (MDI) mutual quantum entity authentication (MQEA) scheme guarantees its security under any quantum attacks on measuring devices that have been reported. Using the MDI architecture in our scheme, the third party can only know the correlation of the transmitted qubits through the Bell state measurement, and it cannot obtain the secret key information. In order to confirm the security of the proposed scheme, we present a security analysis of secret key information that is pre-shared among legitimate users, and we analyze Eve's impersonation attack. Furthermore, we compare the MDI MQEA with other existing QEA schemes English SPRINGER Measurement-device-independent mutual quantum entity authentication Article 10.1007/s11128-021-03093-1 1 QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING, v.20, no.4 QUANTUM INFORMATION PROCESSING 20 4 scie scopus 000642410000001 2-s2.0-85104767155 Quantum Science & Technology Physics, Multidisciplinary Physics, Mathematical Physics Article Quantum entity authentication Quantum hacking Measurement-device-independent Impersonation attack